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 A pledge to license standard essential patents (SEPs) on a non- discriminatory basis is a common 
element of SDO IPR Policies, part of the larger commitment to license on Fair, Reasonable, 
and Non- Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. In this chapter we consider what non- discrimination 
pledges imply for SDO member conduct. We review the basic variants of such pledges, how 
they may be informed by broader legal and economic defi nitions of discrimination, and recent 
cases and agency guidance interpreting such commitments. We conclude with open questions 
regarding the legal implications of non- discriminatory licensing pledges. 
 A.  Origins of Non- Discrimination Commitments in Standard- Setting 
 1.  Non- Discrimination in the Law 
 Prohibitions on discrimination of one kind or another pervade modern legal systems. They 
exist to prevent the unfair treatment of individuals on the basis of specifi ed traits in arenas of 
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social interaction including employment, housing, voting, free movement and access to facil-
ities. 1 Nondiscrimination principles also exist in international trade law (for example, requiring 
the like treatment of goods originating from all members of a treaty union) and the regulation 
of broadcast networks (e.g., so- called “equal access” and “network neutrality” requirements). 
Competition and antitrust law also embody principles of nondiscrimination, both as to unilat-
eral conduct by dominant market participants 2 and as to concerted action by competitors seek-
ing to disadvantage others. 3 
 As described in  Chapter 9 , contemporary FRAND commitments trace their origins to a ser-
ies of U.S. antitrust enforcement actions in the early to mid- twentieth century. These actions 
sought to break up arrangements among groups of competitors that tended to restrict entry to 
markets and otherwise distort competition. The remedial orders entered upon conclusion of 
these cases generally sought to open the playing fi eld to all market participants. For example, in 
 U.S. v. Hartford- Empire, the Supreme Court approved an order requiring a group of competitors 
in the glassmaking industry to charge “uniform reasonable royalties … without discrimination or 
restriction” on licenses of their glassmaking machinery patents. 4 
 Prohibitions against discrimination also appear throughout the case law and agency guidance 
relating to patent pools. 5 In general, members of a patent pool can avoid the specter of antitrust 
liability by committing to license the pooled patents to all applicants on comparable terms, 
whether or not they may compete with the pool members. The broad availability of pooled pat-
ents on a nondiscriminatory basis was a key factor leading the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
to approve pooling arrangements for patents covering the MPEG- 2, DVD and 3G standards. 6 
For example, the DOJ explains in its business review letter concerning the 6C DVD patent pool 
that because the pool administrator “must license on a non- discriminatory basis to all interested 
parties, it cannot impose disadvantageous terms on competitors, let alone refuse to license to 
them altogether,” thereby enhancing competition in the relevant market. 7 
 2.  Non- Discrimination in Standards Development 
 As early as 1932, the American Standards Association (ASA), predecessor to the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), began to permit the inclusion of patented technologies 
in standards so long as “monopolistic tendencies” were avoided. 8 In 1959 the ASA fi rst adopted 
 1  In the United States, these principles trace their roots to the Equal Protection Clause (Amendment 13) of the U.S. 
Constitution, enacted in 1865 in connection with the abolition of human slavery. Since then, statutes such as the 
Fair Housing Act (1968) and the [Equal Employment Act] have instantiated these principles in specifi c areas. In the 
European Union, Article 45 of the Treaty of Rome ( 1957 ) ensures nondiscrimination in employment on the basis 
of national origin and Article 157 ensures equal treatment of men and women in employment; the 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam (codifi ed at Article 19(a) TFEU) extends individual nondiscrimination principles to race, ethnic origin, 
religion, disability, age and sexual orientation. Even international standards relating to corporate social responsibility 
establish principles for the elimination of discrimination against individuals (see ISO 26000). 
 2  See, e.g., Art. 102(c) TFEU, an abuse of a dominant position may consist in “applying dissimilar conditions to equiva-
lent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage.” 
 3  See  Chapter 9 and Contreras  2015b describing numerous U.S. remedial antitrust orders requiring nondiscriminatory 
patent licensing in order to redress anticompetitive collusion. 
 4  United States v. Hartford- Empire Co. (U.S. 1945, p.574). 
 5  For a description of how non- discriminatory licensing is handled by patent pool administrators including MPEG- LA, 
Sisvel and Via Licensing, see Gilbert ( 2011 , 873– 75). 
 6  See DOJ– MPEG- 2; DOJ– 3C DVD; DOJ– 6C DVD; DOJ– 3GPP; DOJ FTC 2007– Guidelines, 72. 
 7  DOJ– 6C DVD at 14. 
 8  ASA  1932 . See discussions at Contreras  2015b and Layne- Farrar  2014 . 
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a requirement that licenses of standards- essential patents by SDO participants be “reason-
able.” In 1970, ANSI added a requirement that such licenses be “demonstrably free of any 
unfair discrimination,” thus establishing the basis for ANSI’s current FRAND commitment. 9 
 Though SDOs are reticent about the rationales underlying particular components of their 
IPR policies, 10 commentators have advanced several theories regarding the function of non- 
discrimination commitments in standard setting. At a basic level, it is believed that the availabil-
ity of licenses to practice SEPs on a non- discriminatory basis is intended to promote the adoption 
of standards within an industry. That is, such a commitment assures market participants that if 
they incorporate a standardized technology into their products, they will not be disadvantaged 
in the marketplace vis- à - vis their competitors. As Lemley and McGowan frame the issue, “the 
general danger of allowing a private party to own intellectual property rights in an open standard 
is that the private party may at some point attempt to [distort competition], either by licensing 
it on discriminatory terms, by setting an unreasonable price for continued access, or simply by 
denying access (a license) altogether.” 11 
 A committee of the U.S. National Academies of Science expresses a similar view:
 without FRAND, a patent owner might license its own customers and partners under terms 
that differ from those offered to a signifi cant rival, either within or outside the bounds of anti-
trust law and other legal constraints. Thus, an objective of a FRAND licensing commitment 
is to avoid discriminatory licensing terms that disadvantage some licensees by imposing on 
them substantially larger royalties or more restrictive conditions in comparison with others. 
Indeed, this assurance of non- discrimination is fundamental to the weighing of benefi ts and 
costs that an industry participant makes when deciding whether to participate in an SSO or 
adopt a standard. 12 
 And as long ago as 1992, as ETSI was debating its fi rst patent policy, the European Commission 
emphasized the importance of non- discrimination in SEP licensing, particularly when stand-
ards embody mandatory governmental requirements:
 Terms and conditions applied to participants and non- participants should not signifi cantly dis-
criminate against the latter. A  fortiori where the standard- making body acts in an offi cial or 
quasi- offi cial standard- making capacity and where its standards are recognized and even made 
compulsory by virtue of legislation, access to the standard must be available to all without a pre- 
condition of membership of any organization. 13 
 Others have argued that non- discrimination commitments reinforce the fair and reasonable 
aspects of the FRAND commitment. For example, Gilbert argues that the ND prong enables 
weaker fi rms to benefi t from the bargaining power of stronger fi rms. 14 Such leveraging could 
  9  USASI  1970 , § 86. USASI was the successor to ASI and changed its name to ANSI in 1969. Nevertheless, the 1970 
Operating Procedures, adopted after the name change to ANSI, still refer to USASI. The 1969 version of the USASI 
Operating Procedures used a similar, but less conventional, formulation, requiring “specifi ed terms and conditions 
that are demonstrably [alternate text: reasonable and non- discriminatory] nonexclusionary.” USASI 1969, § 84. 
 10  Though bucking that trend, the European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) has made public the 
meeting records covering its initial IPR policy debate in the early 1990s. These debates have been discussed in the 
literature including Iversen ( 2001 ), Bekkers et al. (2002), and Geradin (2014). It seems that the non- discriminatory 
aspects of FRAND, though embodied in ETSI’s early policies, were not discussed in detail during this period.  See 
also  Chapter 9 . 
  11  Lemley & McGowan  1998 , 760. 
 12  NAS  2013 , 53– 54. 
 13  EC  1992 , 19. 
 14  Gilbert  2011 , 870. 
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work to promote broad adoption of standards as well as market entry by smaller players. Gilbert 
also observes that non- discrimination covenants permit all licensees of a SEP to obtain equiva-
lent terms whether they negotiate with the SEP holder before (ex ante) or after (ex post) adop-
tion of the standard. 15 However, as we discuss further below, depending on the circumstances, 
differences in timing can be justifi cations for differences in terms and conditions, so this obser-
vation is not absolute. Even so, the use of ex ante licenses to guide ex post license terms can 
work to eliminate the possibility that a SEP holder will be able to charge rates that include 
the licensee’s switching costs and thus exceed the value of the patented technology. Carlton 
and Shampine extend this reasoning to argue that properly- scoped non- discrimination commit-
ments can serve as important bulwarks against potential abusive or “hold- up” conduct by SEP 
holders, 16 even in the absence of ex ante licensing. 17 
 On the negative side however, Gilbert observes that non- discrimination covenants may 
discourage the negotiation of low- royalty SEP licenses, even if warranted, as the SEP holder 
may fear the need to offer the same low rates to all licensees. 18 This risk is akin to that associ-
ated with most favored licensee (MFL) clauses, which tend to keep prices high. 19 Notably, 
ETSI’s fi rst interim patent policy in 1993 included such an MFL requirement, but this policy 
was quickly withdrawn in the face of substantial opposition to this and other controversial 
provisions. 20 
 B.  The Range of Contemporary SDO Non- Discrimination Commitments 
 As an initial matter, it is important to understand that SDO- based non- discrimination commit-
ments come in a variety of forms, with different SDOs adopting different versions. The particu-
lar language employed in a non- discrimination pledge can be important to the interpretation 
of a SEP holder’s commitment, so the fi rst step in any case should be a review of the specifi c 
pledge made. 
 The most common form of non- discrimination commitment is the basic FRAND pledge 
to license any patents essential 21 for compliance with a standard on “fair, reasonable and 
non- discriminatory” terms. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) offers 
a representative pledge. Its IPR Policy (which also covers the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC)) includes the following terms: 22 
 If the proposal is accepted on technical grounds, the originator shall ask any holder of such 
identifi ed patent rights for a statement that the holder would be willing to negotiate world-
wide licences under his rights with applicants throughout the world on reasonable and  non- 
discriminatory terms and conditions . Such negotiations are left to the parties concerned and 
are performed outside the ISO or IEC. 
 15  Id., 869– 70. 
 16  For a general discussion of the debate surrounding hold- up in standard- setting, see  Chapter 7 . 
 17  Carlton & Shampine  2014 , 3. 
 18  Gilbert  2011 , 881. 
 19  See, e.g. , Salop & Morton  2013 (“[Most- favored nation clauses (MFNs)] can soften price competition and thereby 
allow fi rms to charge higher prices than they otherwise would. These are harmful collusive effects. MFNs also can 
have exclusionary effects by raising the costs of rivals or entrants that attempt to compete by negotiating lower prices 
from suppliers of critical inputs, or by pioneering a different business model.”) 
 20  See  Chapter 9 ; Geradin 2013, Layne- Farrar 2013. 
 21  For a discussion of essentiality in SDO licensing commitments, see  Chapter 13 . 
 22  ISO/ IEC Directives 2015. 
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 The ETSI IPR Policy provides a similar variant, requiring that its patent- contributing members 
offer “an irrevocable undertaking” that the member is “prepared to grant irrevocable licences on 
fair, reasonable and  non- discriminatory terms and conditions.” 23 
 Some SDOs go on to list specifi c rights that should be covered by a non- discriminatory 
license. For instance, the VITA Standards Organization (VSO) requires that licenses contain 
“nondiscriminatory terms to use, make, have made, market, import, offer to sell, and sell, and to 
otherwise directly or indirectly distribute products.” 24 
 The other common variation, exemplifi ed by the ANSI Essential Requirements, calls for 
licensing that is “demonstrably free of unfair discrimination.” 25 This form of pledge appears to 
recognize that “discrimination,” which could be interpreted to mean  any difference in price or 
licensing terms, raises concerns only when such differences are deemed “unfair.” 
 All SDOs that are accredited by ANSI (more than 220 as of this writing) must comply with 
ANSI’s Essential Requirements. Many ANSI- accredited SDOs, particularly those operating 
outside the ICT sector, simply adopt the language of ANSI’s Essential Requirements verba-
tim. 26 And even SDOs that have substantially developed their patent policies, such as the IEEE 
Standards Association, often adopt the ANSI- approved phrase “demonstrably free of any unfair 
discrimination.” 27 
 At least one SDO explicitly expands on this “unfair discrimination” language, observing that 
mere differences in price or other terms do not necessarily amount to prohibited discrimination. 
In particular, the Telecommunications International Association (TIA) makes the following 
clarifi cation in its IPR Guidelines:
 The term “non- discriminatory” does not mean or imply that licensing terms must be the same 
for all applicants. Discrimination and difference are not the same. It is understood that the 
process of license negotiation and the components of consideration between parties can vary 
substantially yet be fair. The term “non- discriminatory” implies a standard of even- handedness. 
An example of conduct that would constitute discrimination is a willingness to license all appli-
cants except for competitors of the licensor. 28 
 Below we discuss some of the economic and legal rationales for distinguishing among these 
variants. 
 C.  Price Discrimination and Competition Law 
 As described in  Part B above, most SDO policies that impose non- discrimination commit-
ments on their members provide few details regarding what is meant by “discrimination” and 
the types of discrimination that are prohibited. 29 In this part, we explore various defi nitional 
aspects of the term discrimination and seek to tie these to the FRAND commitments and cases 
summarized above. 
 23  ETSI Directives  2015 . 
 24  VITA  2015 . 
 25  ANSI  2016 , Sec. 3.3.1(b)(i).  See also ABA  2007 , 23 (discussing ANSI formulation of non- discrimination obligation). 
 26  Based on a  2012 review conducted by ANSI staff, approximately 92 percent of ANSI- accredited SDOs (250 of 272 
policies reviewed) either incorporated the ANSI patent policy by reference into their own policies, or reprinted the 
ANSI policy as their own, with only minimal deviations (e.g., substituting the name of the SDO for “ANSI”).  See 
Contreras  2015a . 
 27  IEEE- SA 2015, Sec. 6.2(b). 
 28  Telecommunications Industry Association  2005 . 
 29  See DOJ- FTC  2007 , 47 n.77. 
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 1.  Economic Approaches to Price Discrimination 
 In analyzing the meaning of discrimination, it is useful to begin with the economic concept of 
“price discrimination.” The general economic defi nition of price discrimination hinges on pro-
duction cost: price discrimination is defi ned as selling the same product to different customers 
for different prices when those differences are not justifi ed by differences in the cost of produc-
tion or supply. 30 
 Because marginal production costs play little role in patent licensing, the economic defi nition 
for physical goods requires substantial modifi cations for application to IP. 31 The development of 
patented technologies often involves high up- front R&D costs and can involve high risks stem-
ming from the fact that, in most cases, the up- front investments must be incurred without any 
guarantee that they will ever be recouped. On the other hand, once an invention is developed, 
the marginal cost of licensing tends to be relatively low (comprised of license monitoring costs, 
patent maintenance fees, and patent enforcement expenses paid as needed). For IP- related dis-
crimination, economics therefore focuses on the effect of price differences on social welfare. 
 It is important to understand that price discrimination is not necessarily harmful; it can be 
neutral or even raise social welfare. The key here is the effect of price discrimination on out-
put. A simple example helps to clarify the dynamic. Suppose there are two kinds of customers, 
both of whom equally desire to purchase a product, but one of whom is budget constrained. In 
order to sell to the budget constrained group, the seller would have to lower its price by half. 
The seller would exit the market if it could sell only at the low price that appeals to the budget 
constrained group, however, because its profi ts would be insuffi cient. If it must set a uniform 
price, then, it will charge a price at which only non- constrained customers buy. But without 
any restrictions on price (and assuming the seller can prevent arbitrage), the seller will price 
discriminate, lowering the price for the budget constrained customers only. In this case, price 
discrimination expands output and enables a group of buyers (budget constrained customers) 
to be served that would otherwise be “priced out” of the market. 32 Thus, price discrimination 
here raises consumer welfare: more consumers can buy at a price they are willing to pay and 
the non- constrained customers are not harmed by the price discrimination as they are paying 
exactly what they would have paid in the but- for world without price discrimination. Under 
these circumstances, price discrimination also raises total welfare: the seller sells more products, 
and even though profi ts are lower on sales to the constrained group, they are non- zero thereby 
increasing overall profi ts. It is only when output is reduced by price discrimination that welfare 
is lowered, and hence discrimination is harmful. 
 Economists categorize price discrimination as one of three types:  fi rst, second, and third 
degree. 33 Under fi rst- degree (or perfect) price discrimination, the seller captures all revenue sur-
plus by pricing each and every unit sold at exactly the customer’s maximum willingness to pay for 
the good. Note that customers will still be willing to buy the good at this price, but no customer 
will earn rents from the transaction by paying less than the highest amount it would have been 
willing to pay. This form of price discrimination is relevant for monopoly sellers and requires a 
tremendous amount of information (the monopolist must know each and every customer’s max-
imum valuation for the good or service). While it transfers consumer surplus to the producer, 
perfect discrimination also eliminates the deadweight loss associated with monopolies, meaning 
 30  Carlton & Perloff  2004 ; Posner  2001 , 79– 80. 
 31  Areeda & Hovenkamp  2014 , ¶517a; Posner  2001 , 82. 
 32  Schmalensee  1981 ; Klein & Wiley  2003 . 
 33  See generally Areeda & Hovenkamp 2015, ¶721b; Pigou  1920 , 275– 89. 
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that total welfare will be higher. But, as might be expected given information needs, fi rst degree 
price discrimination is quite rare in practice. 
 Second- degree price discrimination is also known as nonlinear pricing or volume discount-
ing. Here, prices vary by the quantity sold. So, for example, a single 12 oz. bottle of cola may 
sell for $1.75, while an eight pack of 12 oz. bottles sells for around $5, or around $0.62 per bottle. 
Volume discounting is common throughout the economy and is typically viewed as effi cient and 
welfare enhancing. 
 Third- degree price discrimination occurs when sellers price according to objective factors, 
such as location or observable consumer characteristics. The classic example is the movie the-
ater that offers student discounts and cheaper tickets for shows before 6:00 pm. This type of price 
discrimination is also generally viewed as effi cient and welfare enhancing. Running a theater 
requires certain fi xed costs – renting the fi lms, operating the physical structure, paying employ-
ees. Offering student discounts expands output to a group of consumers who are typically budget 
constrained and who would likely buy fewer movie tickets without the discount. Discounting 
prices for all customers before 6:00 pm increases off- peak use of the theater and helps to spread 
the fi xed costs of operation across a larger sales base. Thus both of these practices potentially 
raise output and increase welfare. 
 The same factors relating to fi xed costs are often at play for IP licensing. As discussed above, 
investments in R&D must be made upfront and may entail signifi cant risks. Being able to charge 
different licensing prices depending on the licensee’s valuation of the patented technology can 
increase use of the technology (expand output) and can also help an innovator to cover its R&D 
costs, which in turn can increase incentives to invest in R&D in the fi rst place. Thus we com-
monly see third- degree price discrimination in patent licensing, such as when a patent holder 
sets different rates for use of the patented technology in different end product markets, fi elds of 
use or geographical markets. 
 We also commonly see forms of volume discounting (second- degree price discrimination) 
in patent licensing. First, many industries practice portfolio licensing, in which a fi rm’s entire 
set of patents related to a given technology (e.g., all patents related to the 802.11 Wi- Fi stand-
ard, whether or not technically essential to practice the standard) are licensed as a bundle. The 
price set for the portfolio license is almost always cheaper than the sum of the licensing price 
for each and every patent on an individual basis – if, in fact, the patent holder would even con-
sider licensing the patents  à la carte. 34 Indeed, many portfolio licenses are priced on the basis of 
a handful of “representative” patents, with the remainder of the portfolio not explicitly priced, 
which is a kind of volume discount for licensing multiple patents in a single agreement. 
 A second form of volume discount applies to the units the royalty is applied to. That is, 
in arm’s length agreements, large licensees, who are expected to sell signifi cant quantities of 
licensed goods, typically pay a lower per unit royalty fee than smaller players. While the mar-
ginal cost factors behind traditional product volume discounts are not the driving force in patent 
license volume discounts, they do play some role. In particular, the licensor can earn a larger 
return on its R&D from a single large licensee, than from multiple smaller licensees, as a result 
of lower aggregate negotiation and monitoring costs. More importantly, though, the practice 
has other sound economic justifi cations. Namely, a large licensee can act as a “market maker,” 
ensuring the commercial success of the patented technology. This can be particularly important 
to establish the market for a new technology standard, as there is no guarantee that a standard 
will succeed in the marketplace even after SDO members spend years developing it. 
 34  Layne- Farrar & Salinger  2016 . 
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 2.  Price Discrimination and Antitrust Law 
 While the economic defi nition of price discrimination is rooted in welfare, the legal defi nition 
derives from notions of fairness and equal treatment. 35 As noted above, price discrimination 
standing alone is not illegal, and has been recognized by the Supreme Court to occur in well- 
functioning competitive markets. 36 In order for price discrimination to result in a violation of 
U.S. antitrust law today, it must arise either from collusion among competitors (Sherman Act, 
Section 1), from exclusionary conduct indicating monopolization or attempted monopolization 
(Sherman Act, Section 2). 37 Price discrimination, particularly when persistent and systematic, is 
often used as a means to identify market power. 38 Price discrimination may also be an indication 
of collusive cartel activity. 39 
 Under U.S. law, in order to establish anticompetitive price discrimination, proof of output 
reduction, market foreclosure/ competition softening, 40 or SDO member capture (and distortion 
of a standard) must be provided. 41 Observe that the antitrust laws today are meant to protect 
overall competition, not individual competitors. 42 Showing that overall output is lower or that 
competition in the market as a whole is softer as a result of price discrimination is an import-
ant means of meeting that threshold. The third condition listed above – SDO member cap-
ture  – warrants further explanation. The concern here is that preferential pricing offered to 
SDO members with suffi cient clout to sway votes over the selection of technologies to include 
in a standard could distort the standard setting process. 43 To the best of our knowledge, however, 
this concern remains a theoretical one as we are unaware of any antitrust cases making such an 
argument. Establishing proof of an anticompetitive effect can be direct, such as evidence of lost 
sales or profi ts resulting from price differentials, or inferential, such as a price difference over 
a sustained period of time involving a product that is resold in a highly competitive market. In 
either case, the plaintiff must prove, at a minimum, likely injury to competition. In order to 
obtain damages, the plaintiff needs to prove actual injury to competition. 
 The broad legal category of price discrimination is then parsed into three distinct types: pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary line injuries. Primary line injury has two requirements:  (1)  the 
seller’s price must fall below an appropriate measure of cost; and (2) the seller must be likely to 
recoup its investment in below- cost pricing by charging higher (implicitly supra- competitive) 
prices later on. In short, primary line price discrimination is the use of below- cost pricing to 
drive out competitors, after which prices are raised again, far above their original pre- predation 
levels. In order for this tactic to be successful (i.e., profi table), re- entry by the formerly foreclosed 
rivals must be diffi cult or impossible (e.g., the market must be protected by barriers to entry). 
 Secondary line injury relates to tilting the competitive playing fi eld among buyers. Offering 
different prices to different buyers could place the buyer facing the higher price at a competi-
tive disadvantage. Clearly for this injury to apply, favored and disfavored buyers must be in 
direct competition with one another. Finally, tertiary line injury involves price discrimination 
 35  Gifford & Kudrle  2010 . 
 36  Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc. (U.S. 2006, p.44). 
 37  See, generally, Woodcock (2017). 
 38  Areeda & Hovenkamp  2014 , ¶517a;  United States v. Grinnell Corp. (U.S. 1966, 566– 67). 
 39  Posner  2001 , 81. 
 40  American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp . (U.S. 1982). 
 41  TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Telephone Co . (E.D. Pa.  2012 ). 
 42  This represents a reversal of early antitrust theory, which did have the protection of competitors in mind.  See Gifford 
& Kudrle  2010 , 1268. 
 43  Geradin et al.  2008 .  See also Layne- Farrar  2010 . 
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against product resellers, and as such is not relevant for our discussion of discriminatory patent 
licensing. 
 Despite the restrictive any “difference in price” legal metric, in regards to patent licensing, 
discrimination is commonly thought of in terms of licensee characteristics and hence does allow 
for differences in pricing across buyers. Offering different licensing terms to “similarly situated” 
licensees is generally viewed as discriminatory, as can be offering the same licensing terms to 
“differently situated” licensees. 44 Determining whether two or more licensees are “similarly situ-
ated” then entails an assessment of relevant observable features across the licensees, including 
the fi rms’ particular use of the licensed IP (which will affect valuations of that IP), fi rm size and 
expected revenues (relating to the extent of the use of the patented technology), competitive pos-
ition in the relevant marketplace, the time span for which the patented technology is expected 
to remain valuable to licensees (which may be considerably shorter than the statutory term of 
the patent), and so forth. This list is not exhaustive and would need to be tailored to the precise 
patents and products at issue. 
 With so little guidance given by the courts as to the necessary elements of an antitrust claim 
for breach of a FRAND commitment, it is diffi cult to know what the evidentiary requirements 
would be. We can surmise, however, on the basis of other antitrust requirements, that a plaintiff 
would fi rst need to establish that the SEP holder has market power. Even where “essential” pat-
ents are involved, though, we cannot assume market power. Patents do not automatically confer 
market power: different technical solutions may provide close substitutes. In many cases, com-
pliance with a technical standard is measured by output (does the product perform as expected) 
and is  not measured by input (does the product implement the steps specifi ed by an SDO). As 
a result, fi rms can sometimes fi nd different ways to comply with a standard other than follow-
ing the specifi cations codifi ed by the SDO, and thereby avoid infringing apparently “essential” 
patents. Moreover, standards can sometimes compete with one another (e.g., UMTS versus 
CDMA2000), such that even if there were no alternative to a SEP within a given standard, a 
licensee could move to a different standard within the same market space (or a different product 
that end users view as a substitute within the same market). Finally, bargaining power of the SEP 
holder as compared to the licensee can matter too; the presence of strong licensees can mod-
erate a SEP holder’s market power. Assuming the market power threshold is met, the next step 
likely would be showing adverse effects on competition due to differential pricing. Specifi cally, 
it is likely that the court would require evidence of reduced output or softening competition. 
 Outside of the U.S. several jurisdictions have sought to address discriminatory conduct in rela-
tion to SEP licensing through express rules and policy guidelines. In the European Union, for 
example, a general focus of competition law is to prevent dominant fi rms from harming rivals 
through differential pricing and discounting practices. 45 This general theme has been enforced 
through application of Article 82(c) to a range of allegedly abusive discriminatory practices. 46 
Today, EU courts recognize two general types of price discrimination: when a dominant seller 
offers goods below its average variable cost, and when it offers goods below average total cost, but 
above average variable cost. The former is viewed as preemptively abusive, whereas the later can 
be justifi ed by economic rationales and is therefor viewed as ambiguous and not preemptively 
abusive. 47 
 44  Dratler  1994 . 
 45  Gifford & Kudrle  2010 , 1275.  See generally  Chapters 6 and  17 . 
 46  See Gifford & Kudrle  2010 , 1278– 79. 
 47  Id. at 1279. 
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 Korean competition authorities have sought to align Korean antitrust law with that of the 
U.S. and EU in the area of FRAND licensing. 48 In 2014 the Korean Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC) issued IPR Guidelines that enumerated several examples of abusive conduct, includ-
ing “unfairly imposing discriminatory conditions when licensing standard essential patents.” 49 
 Article 55 of the Chinese Antimonopoly Law (AML) deals with antitrust violations arising 
from the abuse of intellectual property. 50 In written guidelines relating to the AML, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) identifi es discrimination against similarly- 
situated entities with respect to royalties, territory and license duration as potential abuses of 
dominant position. 
 D.  Cases Addressing Non- Discrimination and FRAND 
 1.  Legal Bases for Discrimination Claims 
 As noted by Landes and Posner (2003), “price discrimination is not in general unlawful.” The 
focus of this chapter is the non- discrimination prong of FRAND commitments. While independ-
ent antitrust and competition law actions can be brought in the U.S. under the Sherman Act and 
FTC Act, 51 and in the EU under TFEU Articles 81, 82 and 102, 52 we do not focus on these actions 
except to the extent that they are based on an alleged violation of the non- discrimination prong 
of a pre- existing FRAND commitment. In addition, claims for breach of contract, promissory 
estoppel and fraud may be brought with respect to alleged breaches of FRAND commitments. 53 
As the theory and procedure underlying each of these types of claims are discussed elsewhere 
in this volume, we focus solely on the particular features of such claims that are highlighted by 
alleged violations of a SEP holder’s non- discrimination pledge. 
 2.  Discussion of Cases Alleging Improper Discrimination 
 Below is a brief summary of illustrative cases in which claims were raised that a SEP holder 
violated its commitment to grant licenses on non- discriminatory terms. This summary does not 
purport to be comprehensive, and not all of the cases have been adjudicated to fi nal decisions. 
 a)  U.S. Cases 
 The issue of non- discrimination under FRAND commitments has come up in several U.S. cases. 
Charges of discriminatory SEP licensing in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act were 
brought in  Broadcom v. Qualcomm (2007). In that case, the allegations included claims that 
Qualcomm was charging double royalties to manufacturers who used non- Qualcomm chipsets, 
and demanding overly broad cross- license rights from its licensees, among other things.” 54 The 
court denied Qualcomm’s motion to dismiss, fi nding that a breach of a FRAND commitment 
could form an antitrust violation, but the case settled before any substantive ruling was made. 
 48  See  Chapter 19 . 
 49  KFTC 2014, § III.5.A(5).  See  Chapter 19 . 
 50  See  Chapter 18 . 
 51  In addition, the Robinson- Patman Act (15 U.S.C. § 13) prohibits certain forms of price discrimination. Given that 
predatory pricing is seldom raised in cases involving FRAND commitments, and is unlikely to implicate the non- 
discrimination prong of FRAND commitments, we do not discuss it here. 
 52  See Gifford & Kudrle  2010 , 1272– 75. 
 53  See  Chapter 11 . 
 54  Qualcomm v. Broadcom , (3rd Cir. 2007, 317– 18). 
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 In  In re Innovatio , discriminatory licensing in violation of a FRAND commitment was also 
alleged. In his decision, Judge Holderman held that “a RAND licensor such as Innovatio cannot 
discriminate between licensees on the basis of their position in the market,” so any method for 
assessing FRAND should also account for consistent treatment of licensees. 55 Likewise, in 2015, 
an arbitration panel found that certain royalties charged by Ericsson to its licensee Huawei were 
inconsistent with the non- discrimination commitment that Ericsson made to ETSI. 56 
 b)  Europe 
 In  Samsung v. Unwired Planet , 57 the UK Court of Appeal considered the effect of a FRAND 
non- discrimination covenant on SEPs transferred from Ericsson to Unwired Planet, a patent 
assertion entity (PAE), as part of a portfolio of over 2,800 patents and patent applications. In the 
case, Huawei argued that when Ericsson transferred certain SEPs to Unwired Planet, it failed 
to ensure that Unwired Planet’s licenses of those patents be on terms consistent with those pre-
viously charged by Ericsson. In other words, Huawei argued that Unwired Planet should not be 
free, following the acquisition of Ericsson’s SEPs, to charge rates and impose terms that may 
be non- discriminatory as compared to other licenses granted by Unwired Planet, but which fail 
to take into account licenses previously granted by Ericsson. The court agreed, holding that 
“Article 101 TFEU required the effective transfer to [Unwired Planet] of Ericsson’s FRAND obli-
gation so that [Unwired Planet] could not obtain more favourable terms from its licensees than 
Ericsson could itself have obtained,” and that permitting this to occur would “allow Ericsson to 
circumvent its own FRAND obligations by increasing licence fees and weakening the competi-
tion between Ericsson and other users of its SEPs.” 58 
 The same dispute led to a subsequent decision in  Unwired Planet v. Huawei (2017). There, the 
court held that the non- discrimination prong of ETSI’s FRAND commitment does not create a 
“hard- edged” test in which a licensee may challenge an existing license solely on the basis that 
another similarly- situated licensee was granted a license at a lower rate, so long as the difference 
does not distort competition between the two licensees. 59 As such, the court grounded its ana-
lysis of non- discrimination squarely in competition law, rather than the presumed contractual 
understanding of the parties and the ETSI participants that originated the policy giving rise to 
the relevant FRAND commitment. 
 c)  India 
 In response to a number of patent infringement suits brought by Ericsson against Indian and 
Chinese mobile device manufacturers, 60 the Competition Commission of India (CCI) initiated 
an investigation of Ericsson’s licensing practices in India, including the fi rm’s compliance with 
its FRAND obligations to ETSI. Among the licensing practices challenged by the CCI was 
Ericsson’s charging royalties based on end product price, which resulted in different per unit 
fees for different licensees (i.e., depending on the price they charged for their end products). 
The CCI found that this pricing mechanism was discriminatory and in violation of Ericsson’s 
 55  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 56  Civil Minutes – General at 2,  TCL Comms. v. Ericsson (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 57  Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd. v. Unwired Planet Inc., (UK Ct. Appeal, 2016).  See also  Chapter 13 (discussing the court’s 
fi ndings as to essentiality of Unwired Planet’s patents). 
 58  Id. at ¶50. 
 59  Unwired Planet (2017) at ¶¶481– 502 (this portion of the ruling is under appeal as of this writing). For more detailed 
discussions see Contreras  2017c and Layne- Farrar and Wong- Ervin 2017. 
 60  See  Chapter 21 for a detailed discussion of FRAND litigation in India. 
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FRAND commitment and Indian competition law. 61 The decision, however, was overturned by 
the Delhi High Court, which found that Ericsson’s licensing practices were consistent with its 
FRAND commitments. 62 These cases remain in process as of this writing. 
 d)  China 
 As discussed in greater detail in  Chapter 18 , in  Huawei v. InterDigital Corp ., Huawei alleged that 
InterDigital (IDC) discriminated against it by charging higher royalties for mobile terminals 
than it charged to other international vendors. In the case, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s 
Court found (and was affi rmed by the Guangdong High People’s Court), as a matter of con-
tractual interpretation, that IDC violated its FRAND commitment by charging Huawei higher 
royalties than certain other vendors, and by requiring Huawei to grant royalty- free licenses of its 
own patents to IDC. In addition, the Shenzhen court found that IDC’s discriminatory licensing 
practices with respect to Huawei, among other things, constituted a violation of the Chinese 
Antimonopoly Law. 
 e)  Korea 
 In 2009, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) brought an enforcement action against 
Qualcomm, fi nding that it was a dominant fi rm in both the markets for CDMA technology and 
chipsets. 63 The KFTC went on to fi nd that Qualcomm had restricted competition in the chipset 
market by charging discriminatorily high rates for CDMA SEPs to manufacturers who did not 
purchase Qualcomm chips. Specifi cally, the KFTC found that Qualcomm’s conduct violated 
Article 3– 2(1)(iii) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (“MRFTA”) by “unjustly hin-
dering the business undertaking of others.” 64 The KFTC’s ruling was affi rmed by the Seoul High 
Court, which rejected Qualcomm’s argument that its licensing program did not discriminate 
based on the identity of its licensees. 
 Interestingly, as Yi and Kim observe in  Chapter 19 , the 2009 Qualcomm decision may not 
shed much light on the interpretation of FRAND commitments in Korea, as the court found 
that Qualcomm’s discriminatory conduct was a violation of antitrust law, rather than a failure 
to abide by its FRAND commitments. As Yi and Kim explain, “the Qualcomm decision estab-
lished the competition law principle that the ‘non- discrimination’ prong of the FRAND pledge 
requires a vertically- integrated SEP owner not to favor its own component division against com-
peting component makers with FRAND licenses….” 
 In 2016, the KFTC concluded another investigation of Qualcomm with a fi ne of nearly US$1 
billion and a remedial plan that required Qualcomm to grant FRAND licenses to any chipset 
manufacturer requesting such licenses, and to refrain from using the supply of chipsets as lever-
age in SEP licensing negotiations. 65 As of this writing, Qualcomm has appealed this decision. 
 61  Best It Worlds (India) Private Ltd. v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson , Case No. 4 of 2015, Competition Commission 
of India (12 May 2015);  Intex Techs. (India) v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson , Case No. 76 of 2013, Competition 
Commission of India (16 January 2014);  Micromax Informatics, Ltd v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson , Case No. 50 of 
2013, Competition Commission of India (12 November 2013). 
 62  Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Micromax Informatics Ltd. and Mercury Electronics Ltd. , High Court of Delhi at 
New Delhi, Court order of 12 March 2013, Docket no. C.S. (OS) 442/ 2013 . 
 63  For a more detailed discussion of this case, see  Chapter 19 . 
 64  In a recent commentary note, the KFTC was applauded for “a very thorough analysis of the competitive impact 
of that discrimination on competitors that Qualcomm faced in downstream markets for modem and other types of 
chips” First  2016 . 
 65  See  Chapter 19 . 
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 E.  Defining the Contours of Non- Discrimination Covenants 
 The cases described in  Part D above deal primarily with straightforward issues concerning dis-
parate royalty rates charged by SEP holders to standards implementers. A number of more com-
plex issues also arise in the context of the non- discrimination commitment; these are discussed 
in this section. 
 1.  FRAND Commitments and Uniformity of Terms 
 In a strict defi nitional sense, discrimination means treating different parties differently, and pro-
hibitions on discrimination could be interpreted to prohibit any such differential treatment. But 
like the different economic treatment of price discrimination, most legal defi nitions of discrim-
ination do not prohibit every form of differential treatment. For example, an employer cannot 
legally discriminate against job candidates on the basis of race, gender or religion, but can dis-
criminate on the basis of experience, capability and prior references. 
 Likewise, most commentators agree that a commitment to “non- discriminatory” licensing 
does not mean that licenses must be granted to all applicants on identical terms. 66 Yet beyond 
this general consensus, there is little agreement regarding the type and degree of uniformity 
that is required among licenses in order to comply with the non- discrimination prong of a 
FRAND obligation. The differences of opinion in this regard can be substantial. For example, 
Carlton and Shampine argue that “all ‘similarly situated’ fi rms should pay the same royalty 
rate.” 67 Mariniello, on the other hand, takes the view that FRAND is “the outcome of a bilateral 
hypothetical negotiation” and that FRAND license terms may thus “naturally var[y] amongst 
players.” 68 
 Gilbert likewise argues that requiring all licensees to pay identical per unit royalties would 
be both unfair and ineffi cient. 69 Instead, he argues that similarly situated licensees should be 
offered the same schedule of royalties, which may include fi xed fees, running royalties and vol-
ume discounts. Offering these options, he reasons, is procompetitive because “licensees will 
choose the combinations of price and quantity that give them the highest values.” 70 The NAS 
warns, however, that such menus of license choices could become discriminatory if they were 
structured, for example, to advantage only very large users of a standardized technology. 71 
 2.  Non- Price Terms 
 The reasonableness and non- discrimination prongs of the FRAND commitment apply not 
only to monetary royalty rates, but to all terms and conditions of SEP licensing agreements. 
 66  See, e.g. , Initial Determination of A.L.J. Shaw,  In re Certain Wireless Devices with 3G Capabilities and Components 
Thereof, No. 337- TA- 800 at 432 (I.T.C. 2013) (the “non- discrimination” requirement of a FRAND commitment does 
not require that licensing terms for each individual manufacturer or competitor be uniform); ABA  2007 , 22 (in prac-
tice, the terms of all FRAND licenses need not be identical); Carlton & Shampine  2014 , 10; Gilbert  2011 , 872 (“it is 
artifi cial and counterproductive to impose a defi nition of non- discrimination that requires identical licensing terms 
for every licensee”); Layne- Farrar  2011 . 
 67  Carlton & Shampine  2014 , 16. 
 68  Mariniello  2011 , 532. 
 69  Gilbert  2011 , 875. 
 70  Id. 
 71  NAS  2013 , 65. 
9781107129665pt4_p147-260.indd   198 8/8/2017   4:04:56 PM
Non-Discrimination and FRAND Commitments 199
199
Non- monetary terms include (somewhat) quantifi able provisions such as duration, scope, fi eld 
of use, territory, licensed affi liates, cross- licenses and grantbacks, as well as a range of diffi cult 
to quantify terms such as reciprocity, defensive suspension, indemnifi cation and limitations of 
liability. 72 A comparison of these non- monetary license terms is, in general, far more diffi cult 
than a comparison of royalty terms, as differences in language refl ecting the give and take of 
contractual negotiation are diffi cult (if not sometimes) impossible to quantify and compare on 
an aggregated basis. 
 Given the diffi culties of comparison, and the fact that most bilaterally- negotiated agreements 
will include different terms, how should a fact fi nder determine whether one licensee has been 
discriminated against? Must the comparison be conducted on a term- by- term basis, so that if 
the indemnity clause granted to Firm A is more favorable than that granted to Firm B, but the 
confi dentiality provisions in Firm B’s agreement are more favorable than those in Firm A’s 
agreement, has discrimination occurred? Must the licensor give each licensee the benefi t of 
every more favorable term granted to every other licensee, effecting a “race to the bottom” or 
super- most- favored licensee regime? 
 Such an approach could push licensors to become infl exible in the extreme, offering licenses 
on non- negotiable standardized forms only, much as licensing from patent pools is currently 
conducted. 73 However, it is not clear that this lack of fl exibility would work to the benefi t of SEP 
licensees, many of whom have complex business requirements that make the customization of 
license agreements desirable. 
 What’s more, even when contractual terms are facially identical, they may have signifi cantly 
disparate effects on different licensees. This possibility was acknowledged by the arbitration panel 
in a recent dispute between Ericsson and Huawei, in which the panel recognized that “even 
identical terms can take on a different character between discriminatory and non- discriminatory 
depending on the nuances of the situation.” 74 For example, grantback clauses that require a 
licensee to license its full patent portfolio relating to a standard to the SEP holder may have a 
much more serious impact on a technology developer that competes with the SEP holder than 
on a manufacturing fi rm that does not engage in independent technology development. Could 
a technology developer thus claim  de facto discrimination on the basis of a contractual clause 
that is identical to that offered to all other licensees? 
 Given these complexities, some commentators have suggested that each SEP holder offer all 
licensees a uniform “cash only” price to license its SEPs. According to K ü hn, Scott Morton and 
Shelanski ( 2013 , 4), such an arrangement should serve as an “alternative to other pricing arrange-
ments to aid in evaluation of the proposed license terms.” Certainly, such an alternative would 
eliminate many diffi culties of comparing dissimilar price and non- price terms of FRAND offers. 
However, this approach has its downside as well, given the effi ciencies associated with fi rms set-
tling all of their commercial dealings (or as many as possible) with a single contract negotiation. 
Even absent a “cash only” approach, it is likely that the non- discrimination analysis will in many 
cases remain focused largely on monetary terms of FRAND license agreements, with only those 
non- monetary terms of particular importance to the parties and circumstances at hand entering 
the analysis on an as needed basis. 
 72  For a general discussion of these terms, see ABA ( 2007 ). See also Gilbert  2011 , 875– 77; NAS  2013 , 66– 67. 
 73  See ABA  2007 , 22 (observing that offering a uniform set of license terms to all implementers is nondiscriminatory). 
 74  Civil Minutes – General at 9– 10,  TCL Comms. v. Ericsson , (C.D. Cal., May 26, 2016) (citing Arbitration Award in 
Ericsson v. Huawei (2015)). 
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 3.  Non- Discrimination as an Access Requirement (Level Discrimination) 
 As discussed above, early U.S. remedial orders such as those in  Terminal Railroad and  Hartford- 
Empire used non- discrimination mandates to ensure broad market access to relevant resources 
and patented technologies. Thus, in dozens of these orders, patent holders were required to 
grant licenses to “all applicants” requesting such a license. 75 This requirement arose because 
the courts, and the DOJ that brought the suits, believed that open licensing to the marketplace 
would promote competition and remedy improper market concentration. 76 For the reasons dis-
cussed above, it is likely that SDO FRAND commitments, in order to achieve goals of broad 
adoption of standards, also seek to maximize access to patents covering those standards. 77 
 This general view has been supported by courts including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, which held in  Microsoft v. Motorola that the SEP holder, in its declarations to 
the ITU, promised to “grant a license to an unrestricted number of applicants on a worldwide, 
non- discriminatory basis and on reasonable terms and conditions to use the patented material 
necessary” to practice the ITU standards. This language admits of no limitations as to who or 
how many applicants could receive a license (i.e., it specifi es an “unrestricted number of appli-
cants”). 78 A similar commitment to universal access to SEPs was adopted by the IEEE in recent 
amendments to its intellectual property policy. 79 Likewise, as noted above, in its 2016 remedial 
order against Qualcomm, the KFTC required that Qualcomm grant FRAND licenses under its 
SEPs to any component manufacturer requesting one. 80 
 But others have argued that the “non- discrimination” prong of the FRAND commitment does 
not require SEP holders to offer licenses to every applicant that requests one, but only to avoid 
discrimination among the class of applicants that the SEP holder chooses to license. 81 In other 
words, a SEP holder may wish to refuse to grant licenses (or to otherwise enforce its SEPs) to 
certain classes of potential licensees, even if they have requested licenses. 
 This approach is largely motivated by the doctrine of patent exhaustion, 82 under which a 
patent holder may collect a royalty only once per patented article. Here is the crux of the debate. 
Technology standards are typically implemented throughout a production chain, so that all 
component makers (chip fabricators, battery suppliers, software designers, etc.) must comply 
with the standard specifi cations in order to interoperate with one another and so that the end 
product as a whole (tablet, handset, laptop, DVD player, etc.) is compliant with the standard. 
In this regard, nondiscrimination in the standard context presents very different circumstances 
from the early remedial cases discussed above, which were focused on access by a largely uni-
form group of rivals (e.g., rail lines accessing a set a tracks) rather than disparate fi rms along a 
production chain accessing interoperability technology. Nevertheless, when a product embody-
ing a patent is sold by an authorized licensee, the patent is “exhausted” and no further royalties 
can be collected, unless particular contractual measures are taken (and these remain uncertain 
 75  See Contreras  2015b . 
 76  See, e.g. ,  Hartford- Empire Co. v. United States (U.S. 1945, p.411) (purpose of decree was to “dissolve combination and 
prevent future combinations of like character”);  United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., (General Electric II) (D.N.J. 1953, 
p.844) (decree intended to “check the intrusion of advantages thereby gained into the mechanics of competition in 
the lamp industry”). 
 77  Carlton & Shampine  2014 , 546 (“all implementers of the standard should be offered licenses to the technology”). 
 78  Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. (9th Cir.  2012 , p.884). 
 79  IEEE- SA 2015, Sec. 6.2(b). 
 80  See  Chapter 19 [Korea]. 
 81  See, e.g. , Crane  2010 ; Anne Layne- Farrar  2010b . 
 82  Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc. (U.S. 2008). 
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in the wake of  Quanta ). Under strict patent exhaustion, the holder of a patent covering an aspect 
of a wireless communications standard could license either the manufacturer of the wireless 
chipset that physically implements that standard or the manufacturer of a smart phone that 
incorporates that chipset and realizes the patented technology. 83 But once a license is granted 
to any link in the supply chain, the patent holder could be prevented by exhaustion from suing 
or extracting any royalty from any subsequent downstream purchaser of the chip. This would 
mean that if component makers are licensed, the full value of using the technology covered by 
the SEP, throughout the production chain, would need to be charged at the component level – 
something that some industries are not structured to handle at present. 
 When license fees are restricted to the value conveyed to a component maker only, and 
licenses further down the product chain are prohibited, many SEP holders will not be able to 
obtain desired levels of compensation for the use of their technologies. It is thus most profi table 
for SEP holders to license as far “downstream” as possible (i.e., to end product manufacturers 
rather than chip or component vendors), in order to receive a royalty based on the relatively 
higher end product price, rather than the lower component price. 84 The current debate asks 
whether this approach unfairly discriminates against the chip and component vendors who are 
refused licenses. 
 SEP holders who refuse to license component vendors take the position that this refusal is 
permissible under their FRAND commitments. 85 They argue that by licensing the downstream 
customers of component vendors, they have, in effect, “indirectly licensed” the component 
vendors, and that refusing to license component vendors does not discriminate against competi-
tors. 86 In other words, as long as all component markets are ignored, no one component maker 
would be placed at a competitive disadvantage. This approach was validated by the district court 
in  Ericsson v. D- Link , which held that Ericsson did not violate a non- discrimination covenant 
made at IEEE by offering licenses only to vendors of “fully compliant” products and refusing 
to license chip and component vendors. 87 Taking an opposite stance, however, IEEE amended 
its IPR policy following this decision to require that SEP holders make licenses available to all 
applicants. That being said, a number of SEP- holding IEEE members have refused to make 
licensing assurances under IEEE’s new FRAND commitment, instead submitting “negative 
declarations” stating that they are unwilling to license their SEPs under IEEE’s terms, and mak-
ing known through other channels that they are prepared to license these SEPs on their own 
terms. 88 
 It is worth noting that requiring SEP holders to grant licenses at the component level would 
likely result in price changes for components in certain markets and a different approach to 
profi t markups for affected component makers. That is, if SEP holders, for example in the wire-
less telecommunications market, were required to charge license fees at the component level, 
 83  Some SEP holders have gone so far as to seek royalties from end users of standardized products. Most conspicuous 
among these was Innovatio, which sent demand letters seeking royalty payments from thousands of coffee shops, 
motels and other public venues offering use of public wireless routers.  See Innovatio (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 84  As explained by a licensing executive for one large SEP holder, “we choose to license the patents as late in value 
chain as possible …. One big advantage with this strategy is also that it is likely that the royalty income will be higher 
since we calculate the royalty on a more expensive product.” Dannelind  2010 . 
 85  See Ericsson v. D- Link (E.D. Tex. 2013, p.*80) (“Ericsson believed it complied with its RAND obligations because it 
did not discriminate against competitors”). 
 86  See Ericsson v. D- Link (E.D. Tex. 2013, p.*80) (“By licensing end product manufacturers, Ericsson believed it was 
indirectly licensing chip manufacturers.”). 
 87  See Ericsson v. D- Link (E.D. Tex. 2013, p.*82). 
 88  See, e.g., Lloyd  2016 ; Katznelson  2016 . 
9781107129665pt4_p147-260.indd   201 8/8/2017   4:04:56 PM
Jorge L. Contreras and Anne Layne-Farrar202
202
they would attempt to capture the full value contributed by the SEPs throughout the production 
chain from these component vendors (which in many cases would mean relatively high royalty 
rates, even greater than 100 percent prior to component industry pricing adjusting), with the 
understanding that the component maker would pass on both the patent rights and at least some 
portion of its royalty costs in its own pricing to downstream production levels. 89 
 4.  Similarly Situated Licensees 
 In  United States v. United Shoe Machine Co ., the court held that the defendant’s discriminatory 
pricing constituted exclusionary conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and ordered it to 
cease discriminating among customers “of the same general class.” 90 In the same vein, several 
commentators and courts have reasoned that under FRAND commitments, discrimination as 
to royalty rates and other terms should be prohibited only as to “similarly situated” fi rms. 91 In 
other words, if two fi rms differ signifi cantly in terms of some set of characteristics, then offering 
them different license terms may be permissible. If this interpretation is correct, then another 
important defi nitional exercise is to specify what characteristics will qualify fi rms as similarly or 
differently situated. 
 One proposal to answer that question comes from Carlton and Shampine, who reason that 
similarly situated fi rms are those that, on an ex ante basis, “expect to obtain the same incremen-
tal value from the patented technology compared to the next best alternative available to be 
incorporated into the standard.” 92 Thus, under their framework, “fi rms in different industries … 
such as a handset manufacturer and a maker of wireless heart monitors, might make devices that 
obtain different incremental values from a patented technology and do not compete with one 
another, and thus can pay different rates.” 93 
 As suggested earlier, royalties and other licensing terms may vary across licensees for a host 
of reasons. For instance, credit availability can affect license payment structure. Suppose Firm 
A and Firm B are both Wi- Fi router manufacturers with global sales, each with headquarters 
in Asia. Further assume that each holds roughly 15 percent of the relevant product market as 
measured by global sales revenues. Suppose, however, that Firm A has a large cash reserve while 
Firm B faces credit constraints. Even if a SEP holder provided both fi rms with identical open-
ing license offers (along the lines of the license schedule noted above), it is highly likely that 
the license contracts concluded by the two licensees will differ. In particular, Firm A may wish 
to take advantage of its cash position by negotiating for an upfront lump- sum license. Because 
money received today is worth more than money received tomorrow, patent holders are typically 
willing to grant signifi cant discounts to licensees making upfront lump sum license payments. 
Upfront payments also remove the risk of failure- to- pay and provide certainty over the payment 
amount (aiding in business planning), which can warrant further discounts. Firm B, in con-
trast, will not be in the position to pay for its license upfront and therefore cannot benefi t from 
the discounts applied to such licenses. Instead, Firm B will likely prefer a license with ongoing 
(typically quarterly) royalty payments over the license term, which enables it to better manage 
its cash fl ow and to avoid the risk of overpayment should its sales of licensed products fall short 
of projected levels. 
 89  Layne- Farrar  2011 ; Layne- Farrar 2017. 
 90  United States v. United Shoe Machine Co . (1954, p.521). 
 91  Gilbert  2011 ; Carlton & Shampine  2013 , 546;  Ericsson v. TCL (2017). 
 92  Carlton & Shampine  2014 . 
 93  Carlton & Shampine  2014 , 17. 
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 Even if we assume that both licensees make identical infringing sales over the duration of 
the license, Firm A will end up paying less than fi rm B in the aggregate as a result of paying in 
advance. But, at least from an economic point of view, the SEP holder will not have unfairly dis-
criminated between Firms A and B. In this scenario, Firm A is providing the SEP holder with a 
valuable payment in kind (the removal of several kinds of risk) that Firm B is unable to provide, 
hence Firm B must make up the difference in a higher explicit license fee. 
 Firms differing on multiple dimensions will only increase the rationale for differing licens-
ing fees. For example, the presence of cross- licensing (another form of payment in kind) can 
lower explicit royalty payments, all else being equal. 94 A fi rm with substantially more sales than 
a rival in the same downstream market may justifi ably negotiate a volume discount, as explained 
above. Geographic differences in markets can also lead to licensing differences because end 
product demand and pricing may vary across locales. Differing product markets provide another 
justifi cation. For example, Wi- Fi router and laptop manufacturers may both be interested in 
implementing the Wi- Fi standard, but are likely to place very different valuations on a given set 
of SEPs, in light of different product prices and market dynamics relevant for each. 95 
 5.  Fairness and Non- Discrimination 
 As described by Gifford and Kudrle ( 2010 ), early legal rules prohibiting discriminatory treatment 
as to rail haulage charges and other commercial activities generally sought to target what were 
widely perceived to be unfair practices. 96 Antitrust laws also have their roots in norms of fair-
ness, 97 leading to early condemnation of discriminatory pricing by fi rms such as Standard Oil. 98 
This aversion to unfair conduct found its way into the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 
Section 5 of which expressly prohibits “unfair methods of competition.” 99 Thus, as observed by 
Gifford and Kudrle, prior to the 1970s, “[l] awyers’ historical preoccupation with fairness issues 
generated by price discrimination provided them with a very different perspective than econo-
mists, who were instead concerned with the welfare effects of discrimination.” 100 This emphasis 
on fairness faded, however, with the economic turn in antitrust enforcement in the 1970s, so that 
today, “fairness has largely disappeared as a factor in antitrust analysis,” having been supplanted 
by a focus on effi ciency and welfare. 101 
 In parallel with the early legal focus, as noted above, beginning in the 1950s several SDOs, led 
by ANSI, incorporated the notion of “unfair” discrimination in their IPR policies. Many SDOs 
today retain this emphasis on fairness, requiring that SEP licenses must be “demonstrably free of 
any  unfair discrimination.” Thus, an additional element is added to the non- discrimination ana-
lysis: whether or not any given discrimination among licensees is fair. If a certain discriminatory 
practice is found to be fair, then it may be permitted under the relevant FRAND policy. But if 
it is not fair, then it is prohibited. In assessing the fairness of potentially discriminatory practices 
by SEP holders, those that are grounded in sound economic rationales and affect similarly situ-
ated licensees in a similar manner are likely to be found to be fair. For example, the installment 
 94  Layne- Farrar 2010b. 
 95  See, e.g. Teece & Sherry  2016 . 
 96  Gifford & Kudrle  2010 , 1255– 56, 1261. 
 97  Id. at 1256, 1258. 
 98  Id. at 1256– 57. 
 99  Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, § 5 (codifi ed at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006)).  See Gifford & Kudrle  2010 , 1258– 59. 
 100  Gifford & Kudrle  2010 , 1259. 
 101  Id. 
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plans, volume discounts and credit for in- kind payments discussed above could be viewed as fair 
forms of discrimination. 
 Going further, commentators such as Swanson and Baumol ( 2005 ) argue that discrimination 
may be justifi ed so long as it is effi cient. They explain that “price discrimination helps a fi rm 
with fi xed costs to recover its outlays and is sometimes necessary in order for a fi rm to recover 
those outlays.” Why does such recovery matter? Because without at least some chance at earn-
ing a return, fi rms that cannot otherwise make up such returns through product or service sales 
may not invest in new innovations. Requiring uniform fees could thus prevent some licensees 
from ever getting a license, which would lower output and reduce SEP holders’ expectations 
of recovering their upfront investments, which in turn would lower those investments and slow 
standards development. Accordingly, Swanson and Baumol reason that “royalties that are ‘rea-
sonable’ for RAND purposes may be literally discriminatory given that such discrimination can 
be consistent with (and often can be compelled by) the existence of competition.” These authors 
propose a parity pricing benchmark for assessing whether a vertically integrated SEP holder’s 
rates are discriminatory for its downstream rival (the Effi cient Component Pricing Rule, or 
ECPR model, as adopted from regulated landline telecommunications monopoly pricing). 
 The Swanson and Baumol focus on vertically integrated SEP holders refl ects the view that it 
is fi rms with downstream operations as well as upstream patents that pose discrimination risks. 
Vertically integrated fi rms can have incentives to tilt the downstream market in their own favor, 
and could thus discriminate against downstream rivals through SEP licensing, placing down-
stream rivals at a disadvantage as compared to the transfer prices set for their own internal use 
of the patents by an end product division. On this theory, Hovencamp et al. (2005) conclude 
that “[a] n antitrust violation is even less likely where the intellectual property owner does not 
compete directly with the disfavored licensee; absent some showing of monopoly leveraging it is 
not clear what incentive the intellectual property owner would have to try to eliminate competi-
tion in the downstream market [through discriminatory licensing fees].” Making a similar point 
in the context of standard setting, Layne- Farrar ( 2010 ) observes that “[n]onintegrated fi rms will 
only be interested in anticompetitive licensing discrimination if it increases their total royalty 
payments, but often it is increased downstream competition that maximizes upstream royalty 
earnings.” 
 The UK High Court in Unwired Planet v. Huawei, without expressly linking its holding to 
notions of fairness, adopts a competition- centric view when it rejects the idea of “hard- edged” 
non- discrimination and reasons that a violation of the ND prong of ETSI’s FRAND commit-
ment will be found only when a difference in pricing distorts competition between licensees. 102 
 In light of the important role that differential patent licensing can play in recouping R&D 
expenditures and expanding markets, Crane ( 2008 ) argues that “the ‘nondiscriminatory’ prong 
of the RAND commitment should be read narrowly to prohibit only discriminatory licensing 
to potential downstream rivals and not price discrimination more generally, else the RAND 
commitment turn into an infl exible commitment to license at identical terms to all potential 
licensees.” 
 These authors and judges thus appear to advance the proposition that some discrimination is 
effi cient and thereby “fair.” In SDOs that prohibit only unfair discrimination, these arguments 
may hold some sway. One must ask, then, whether a fairness standard should also be read into 
FRAND commitments that do not recite this qualifi cation. It is worth remembering that FRAND 
 102  Unwired Planet (2017) at ¶¶481– 502 (this portion of the ruling is under appeal as of this writing). See also  Part 
D.2.b , supra. 
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(fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory) itself is framed in terms of fairness. Thus, among those 
SDOs adopting FRAND as opposed to RAND, even if discrimination is not expressly prohib-
ited only if unfair, one could imbue both the reasonableness and nondiscrimination terms of 
FRAND with some baseline requirement of fairness, much as underlying law often implies a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing into contractual arrangements. This reading of “fair” as a 
modifi er of both reasonableness and nondiscrimination in the FRAND formulation is certainly 
more useful than the typical reading, which is simply to treat “fair” as a superfl uous synonym for 
“reasonable” bereft of any independent content. 103 And if we are to take this step, then we may 
also wish to complete the circle and ask whether it is appropriate to imply this requirement of 
fairness even into SEP licensing commitments that are stated simply as RAND. 
 6.  Non- discrimination Over Time 
 Another complex issue is how the passage of time affects a pledge not to discriminate. There 
are two aspects to the question of temporality associated with non- discrimination. The fi rst is 
the effect of a discovery that the SEP holder discriminated against the licensee at the time the 
license was granted. The second is the effect of changing market conditions after a FRAND 
license has been granted. 
 Under the fi rst scenario, the licensee subsequently discovers discrimination by the SEP holder 
at the time a license was granted (contemporaneous discrimination). This circumstance is made 
more likely by the general non- transparency of the SEP license negotiation process. 104 That 
is, licensees seldom have verifi able information regarding other licenses granted by the SEP 
holder with whom they are negotiating. Without prior license term disclosure, the licensee can-
not know, at the time that a license is granted, whether or not it is being discriminated against. 
Thus, even if the licensee is persuaded, based on its internal requirements and observable mar-
ket factors, that the SEP holder’s proposed royalty rate and other terms are fair and reasonable at 
the time of grant, it is impossible for the licensee to confi rm that the SEP holder has complied 
with its non- discrimination commitment. Usually, the information necessary for the licensee to 
assess the SEP holder’s non- discrimination remains confi dential until it is leaked improperly 
or disclosed through litigation or arbitration discovery. Given this time lag, Gilbert reasons that 
non- discrimination covenants cannot achieve their purpose “unless FRAND can be interpreted 
to apply retroactively to any intellectual property that should have been disclosed ex ante.” 105 
This approach is sensible and corresponds with generally accepted tort liability principles relat-
ing to the discovery of past wrongful acts. 
 The second scenario is more complex. It involves a license that was granted by the SEP 
holder in full compliance with its FRAND obligations, but which, through the passage of time 
and changing market conditions, is no longer as favorable to the licensee as other licenses 
being granted by the SEP holder. Thus, an early licensee could pay a higher royalty rate than 
later licensees. In this case, has the SEP holder impermissibly discriminated against the early 
licensee? 
 One way to think about this question is to look at the “reasonableness” prong of the FRAND 
commitment. A given royalty rate offered prior to the adoption of a new standard may no longer 
be reasonable many years later, when the market and technology have advanced signifi cantly 
 103  See DOJ- PTO  2013 . 
 104  See  Part E.7 ,  infra . 
 105  Gilbert  2011 , 879. 
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(possibly making a higher royalty reasonable) or the standardized technology has moved toward 
obsolescence (possibly making a lower royalty reasonable). These issues are far from theoretical, 
as many standards are not static technology mandates but evolving guidelines. For example, 
work on the most popular global digital mobile phone standard fi rst began in the early 1980s, 
with commercial release of GSM (2G) in the mid to late 1990s. Commercial release of the 3G 
WCDMA evolution of that standard occurred in the early 2000s, and the fi rst commercial roll-
out of 4G LTE was in 2009. Development of 5G is currently under way. Later generations of a 
technology standard tend to build on prior generations, and for consumers’ sake SDO members 
tend to place a high premium on backward compatibility. As a result, patents essential to early 
standards are likely to have at least some value for later generations (though that value may 
diminish over time). On the one hand, in light of the dynamic properties of standard develop-
ment, FRAND valuations should evolve over time as well, to match changing market condi-
tions. On the other hand, license agreements are contracts with specifi ed durations. It would 
eviscerate the many well- recognized benefi ts of contracting and business certainty if agreed 
upon FRAND terms in a given license agreement were not honored. As a practical matter, we 
do not want to create a legal regime in which FRAND is an ever- shifting concept, such that par-
ties cannot count on contractual certainty. 
 Yet another complication arises from how risk can change over time. In particular, in the early 
period of a standard’s rollout, commercial success may be far from certain. Indeed, many stand-
ards fail in the marketplace. SEP holders may wish to give early licensees lower royalty rates 
in order to encourage uptake of the standard, making commercial success more likely. Later 
implementers, who enter the market only after others have established the commercial viability 
of a standard, naturally take less risk than the early licensees. 
 One could thus take the position that the royalty rate agreed by a SEP holder and a licen-
see in a signed license agreement should not be altered due to the passage of time, no matter 
what changes occur in the marketplace, so long as the original license offer complied with 
the SEP holder’s FRAND commitments. This view is further supported by the fact that a 
license agreement’s duration is a negotiated factor: parties wanting stability or those worried 
about rising rates can voluntarily opt for longer contracts; those worried about falling rates can 
opt for shorter- term contracts. This position is not universally accepted, however. Shampine 
(2016) argues that an existing licensee may, in fact, be justifi ed in seeking a lower royalty rate 
if it discovers that the licensor has subsequently offered lower royalty rates to its competitors. 
Yet if non- discrimination implies that already- granted licenses may be adjusted retroactively 
as new information about contemporaneous licenses comes to light, the non- discrimination 
covenant begins to look like a “most- favored- licensee” commitment, which assures a licensee 
that the licensor will not, during the term of the MFL commitment, grant a more favorable 
license to another party. 106 
 But even if existing licenses are not changed due to later circumstances or discoveries, how 
should  new license offers be treated if they are on terms different than earlier license grants? 
Has impermissible discrimination occurred if later licensees are offered at  higher rates than 
earlier licensees? In one sense, this scenario, which gives ex post licensees the benefi t of ex 
 106  See Carlton & Shampine  2013 , 551– 52 (proposing the use of MFL clauses to ensure that royalty rates decrease uni-
formly across FRAND licenses). MFL clauses are often viewed as more powerful than non- discrimination covenants 
precisely because of their retroactive effect. But they also have anticompetitive aspects in that they discourage dis-
counts, tend to keep prices high, and may encourage licensors to shift to rigid uniform licensing. 
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ante negotiation, is precisely what the non- discrimination covenant is intended to prevent. 107 
That is, general consensus has emerged that a good benchmark for what a FRAND rate is for 
a given set of SEPs is the licensing fee (and related terms and conditions) that those SEPs 
could have commanded during the development of the standard, when they were likely 
competing with other technologies for inclusion in the standard (ex ante). The competition 
and lack of any possible technology lock- in render these early rates refl ective of market valu-
ations and are free of holdup costs. But if FRAND valuations can increase over time, that 
progression will need to be accounted for in later licensing agreements, which reduces the 
comparability of early license agreements and again makes discrimination assessments more 
diffi cult. 108 
 As a practical matter, one solution may be to reassess FRAND rates only when a license agree-
ment expires or is up for renewal, with the understanding that what was FRAND at the time the 
prior contract was signed may or may not, depending on the circumstances, still be considered 
FRAND for a new license at the time of renewal. 109 Naturally, this dynamic makes determining 
whether rates are discriminatory more diffi cult, because it means that comparable licenses – the 
bedrock of reasonable royalty assessments – may be in need of subjective modifi cation. 
 7.  Non- Discrimination and Transparency 
 As argued by Gilbert ( 2011 ), the enforcement of a non- discrimination commitment necessarily 
requires that the benefi ciary of such a covenant have some information regarding the terms of 
licenses granted to others. Without this information, it is impossible for the licensee (or any-
one else) to determine whether discrimination has occurred except during litigation or arbitra-
tion, when confi dential discovery reveals relevant prior agreements. As several manufacturers 
of standardized products recently complained, “the ‘non- discriminatory’ part of ‘FRAND’ com-
mitments could not possibly be enforced given the current lack of information about licensing 
terms.” 110 Though calls for greater transparency in SEP licensing have been made, primarily 
by academic commentators, 111 there are no serious SDO or governmental initiatives under way 
to achieve these goals. Such transparency could be achieved either through the advance (ex 
ante) disclosure of a SEP holder’s “standard” licensing terms and rates, or through disclosure 
of terms in concluded licenses. In both of these cases, the identity of the licensee need not be 
publicly disclosed, though maintaining anonymity could be diffi cult. Until one or more of these 
approaches is adopted broadly in the industry, the enforcement of the non- discrimination prong 
of FRAND commitments may remain happenstance, enabled primarily through the disclosure 
of otherwise confi dential information through improper means, or in conjunction with litiga-
tion over other aspects of FRAND licensing in which potentially discriminatory activity comes 
to light. 
 107  See discussion above of Gilbert’s (2011) theory that non- discrimination allows ex post licensees to enjoy the same 
benefi ts as ex ante licensees. 
 108  Carlton and Shampine ( 2013 , 551) argue that “a reasonable policy is to never allow FRAND rates to rise,” given that 
increases in FRAND rates would lead to more disputes, be hard to identify, and thereby “undermine the FRAND 
protection against hold- up.” 
 109  See Shampine 2016. 
 110  R é gibeau et al.  2016 , 70. 
  111  Contreras et al.  2016 , R é gibeau et al.  2016 , 70– 71, Carlton & Shampine  2014 . 




 Despite a handful of litigated cases, the non- discrimination prong of the FRAND commitment 
has not received nearly the attention that the obligation to offer “fair” and “reasonable” royalty 
terms has. Nevertheless, issues of non- discrimination have become increasingly important in 
current disputes over FRAND licensing. While most agree that non- discrimination does not 
require that every potential licensee be offered identical terms, but that similarly situated par-
ties should be offered comparable terms, broad agreement ends there. Open questions remain 
regarding the degree and kind of similarity that should qualify parties to comparable terms, 
and how comparable those terms should be, how “fairness” should be factored into the non- 
discrimination determination, and how to compare non- price terms. A major question exists 
regarding the extent to which non- discrimination requires a SEP holder to offer licenses to all 
applicants, or whether it may license only certain tiers in the supply chain. Moreover, as prior 
generations of standards become obsolete and existing license agreements begin to expire, dif-
fi cult questions will arise regarding the impact of the passage of time on non- discrimination 
commitments, particularly with respect to the appropriate set of licenses to which new agree-
ments should be compared. These questions cannot be answered easily, but with luck some 
combination of litigation results, guidance from SDOs and greater transparency in licensing 
agreements will soon shed needed light on many of these questions. 
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